The Future of U.S.-Iran Relations Under President Biden’s Administration
/By Research Associate Connor Bulgrin
The Future of U.S.-Iran Relations Under President Biden’s Administration
America’s tense relationship with Iran has provided an opportunity for several presidential administrations to earn their foreign policy bona fides. While most presidents since the Iranian Revolution have used America’s hostile relationship with Iran to prove their toughness and unwillingness to negotiate with “state sponsors of terror,” President Obama’s entry into the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) provided an opportunity for diplomacy that had not existed since the Clinton administration. In the last four years, however, the possibilities for diplomacy have been waning. Increasing bellicosity from both the United States and the Islamic Republic has provided an inhospitable environment for negotiations. In this analysis, we examine President Biden’s likely policy toward Iran and whether he will return to America’s historic policy of “toughness” or restore the diplomatic overtures of the Obama era by reentry into the JCPOA.
The Legacy of “Maximum Pressure”
For the last four years, President Trump pursued his “maximum pressure” strategy against Iran. Serving as Trump’s alternative to the JCPOA, this strategy consisted of a combination of “belligerent rhetoric, diplomatic isolation and unilateral sanctions to try to force dramatic changes in Tehran.” President Trump proffered that this policy was intended to increase America’s leverage to secure a better deal with Iran and not about regime change. However, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo seemingly contradicted the president, stating that Washington was willing to help Iranian citizens change their government. Regardless of the policy’s true intentions, it failed to significantly alter the Iranian regime’s behavior — either with respect to its militaristic rhetoric, regional activities, or nuclear ambitions.
The most harmful part of this “maximum pressure” policy regarding the future of U.S.-Iran relations was President Trump’s provocative military actions against the Iranian regime. The assassinations of Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds force, and Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a prominent Iranian nuclear scientist (carried out by Israel but likely with acceptance by the U.S.), severely escalated tensions between the U.S. and Iran. Furthermore, the connections of some Trump officials —most notably National Security Adviser John Bolton—to the controversial Iranian opposition group, Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK), also engendered frustration among the regime and reduced the likelihood of future negotiations.
On the campaign trail, President Biden presented himself as a return to the normalcy of the Obama administration and a rebuke of Trump’s nationalistic “America First” policy. As U.S.-Iran relations are concerned, this meant calling for a return to the JCPOA —the agreement that prevented Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon in return for alleviating strenuous U.S. sanctions and the return of frozen Iranian assets. Returning to the JCPOA was at the center of Biden’s stated Iran policy and likewise the primary focus of the Democratic Party’s stance toward U.S.-Iran relations. The following is the entirety of the Democratic Party platform’s statement regarding Iran:
Democrats will call off the Trump Administration’s race to war with Iran and prioritize nuclear diplomacy, de-escalation, and regional dialogue. Democrats believe the United States should not impose regime change on other countries and reject that as the goal of U.S. policy toward Iran. We believe the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) remains the best means to verifiably cut off all of Iran’s pathways to a nuclear bomb. The Trump Administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA isolated us from our allies and opened the door for Iran to resume its march toward a nuclear weapons capacity that the JCPOA had stopped. That’s why returning to mutual compliance with the agreement is so urgent. The nuclear deal was always meant to be the beginning, not the end, of our diplomacy with Iran. Democrats support a comprehensive diplomatic effort to extend constraints on Iran’s nuclear program and address Iran’s other threatening activities, including its regional aggression, ballistic missile program, and domestic repression.
Despite the rhetoric, returning to a state of mutual compliance with the JCPOA will not be easy. While President Biden is quick to emphasize the importance of keeping American commitments, he is reluctant to return to the agreement without the Iranian regime making the first move. Furthermore, he will need to justify this re-engagement to the U.S. Senate, a new, and possibly conservative, Iranian president, and America’s partners in the P5+1 (France, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and Germany).
Returning to the JCPOA
Returning to the JCPOA – particularly if it involves renegotiation of the agreement - will be no minor feat, yet the Biden administration is reluctant to give details on how it plans to accomplish this goal. The statement on Biden’s website regarding the agreement reads as follows:
The historic Iran nuclear deal, negotiated by the Obama-Biden administration alongside our allies and other world powers, blocked Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. Yet Trump decided to cast it aside, prompting Iran to restart its nuclear program and become more provocative, bringing the region to the cusp of another disastrous war. If Tehran returns to compliance with the deal, President Biden would re-enter the agreement, using hard-nosed diplomacy and support from our allies to strengthen and extend it, while more effectively pushing back against Iran’s other destabilizing activities.7
Biden’s largest means of leverage and best tool for diplomacy is the apparatus of crushing sanctions that the U.S. currently imposes against Iran. However, without the guarantee of economic relief, the Iranian leadership has almost no incentive to negotiate. Complicating matters is the fact that Secretary of State Blinken and President Biden are both reluctant to remove any sanctions without Iran first returning to the provisions of the JCPOA and then agreeing to further terms. Biden has referred to the agreement “as a starting point for follow-on negotiations.” Biden’s National Security Adviser, Jake Sullivan, demands even more from the Islamic Republic in exchange for a reduction of sanctions:
The Iranians will have to get more realistic, too. It is simply impractical to think that the United States will provide significant sanctions relief without assurances that Iran will immediately begin negotiations on a follow-on agreement that at least extends the timelines of the deal and addresses issues of verification and intercontinental ballistic missiles.
These sorts of demands, if maintained, will ensure that no new agreement with Iran is ratified. Moreover, promise of “significant” sanctions relief for full compliance with the JCPOA and further concessions, attempts to ignore the escalating tensions between the U.S. and Iran throughout the last four years and the fact that America, not Iran, first abandoned the JCPOA. Even if such an agreement could be made, Sullivan would likely struggle to deliver on his promise. The process of removing sanctions, especially if they are deemed to be combatting the funding of terrorism, faces massive U.S. political headwinds. Seemingly confirming this reality, President Trump’s U.S. Special Representative for Iran, Elliot Abrams, has confidently asserted that “the US now has a comprehensive sanctions structure in place that will stay for a while.”
Meanwhile, the Iranian regime appears to be dismissing these U.S. political machinations and has offered to return to full compliance with the terms of the JCPOA under European Union supervision provided the United States agrees to synchronize its compliance with Iran’s. Thus far, the Biden administration has snubbed this offer, insisting that Iran must comply first.
Given Biden’s insistence that Iran makes the first move and show signs of agreeing to further terms, there is a significant risk that the Biden administration will fail to utilize the leverage it has. Indeed, if Biden and the Iranian leadership both stick to their current preconditions, they will continue to insist that the other return to their JCPOA obligations, bicker about one another’s respective human rights records, and accomplish nothing. Unfortunately, the internal political forces of each nation make this outcome likely, despite the obviously poor results this would entail for Iran, the Biden administration, and international diplomacy more generally.
Securing Support for a New Agreement: Making the Case for the JCPOA
If Biden manages to begin negotiations with Iran he will find his initial position —that of international isolation fostered by the Trump administration— quite a burden to overcome. Biden will have a long road ahead to secure the support of the broad coalition that originally backed the JCPOA. President Obama’s diplomatic prowess was at its zenith during the negotiations of the JCPOA, as he managed to gain the confidence of centrist Democrats, the P5+1, and the Iranian government. While Biden may be a competent statesman, renegotiation is a monumental task and he will not be able to simply recycle the same arguments made by President Obama.
Obama secured ratification for the JCPOA by employing two central arguments. First, he argued that there would be a war between Israel and Iran if an agreement was not created. Now, the situation is different. Israel has threatened exactly the opposite: that if Biden were to return to the JCPOA, it will attack Iran. While Biden could negate that threat by attaching conditions on foreign aid given to Israel, he is unlikely to do so and the prospect of an Israeli-Iranian war makes ratifying an agreement all the more difficult. Second, Obama argued that without an agreement Iran would build a nuclear bomb. When the JCPOA was first ratified, this seemed like a real possibility. Iran possessed 12,000 kilograms of enriched uranium, a heavy water reactor, and a stockpile of 20% enriched uranium, (This is still considerably far off from the 90% level of enrichment needed for the manufacture of a nuclear weapon.) But as a result of its compliance with the JCPOA, Iran’s uranium stockpile is now severely depleted. Although Iran now has over twelve times the JCPOA-mandated limit of low-enriched uranium (2442.9 kilograms as of November 2020), this is only suitable for producing fuel in power plants. The regime’s recently announced production of 20% enriched uranium at the Fordo facility is also far below weapons-grade levels of enrichment. There is no evidence that the Iranian government is currently enriching or planning to enrich any weapons-grade uranium.
Regardless, Biden and his team have primarily justified rejoining the JCPOA by remarking on its ability to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Secretary of State Blinken, for example, has highlighted the reduction in Iran’s “breakout time” (i.e. the amount of time it would take for Iran to produce enough fissile for a nuclear weapon if it so desired). Under the JCPOA, Iran’s estimated breakout time was approximately a year; it is now only a few weeks, according to Blinken’s estimate. While Blinken is likely exaggerating the capability of Iran to produce a nuclear weapon in order to promote negotiations, as secretary of state, his analysis will undoubtedly be influential regardless of its accuracy. Blinken’s sense of urgency also exposes the largest contradiction within the Biden administration’s Iran policy. While members of the administration act as if Iran’s possible acquisition of a nuclear weapon is an urgent matter, they hesitate to act or embrace negotiations, imposing increasingly onerous demands on the regime before they are willing to participate.
These contradictory sentiments are unlikely to win over the many audiences Biden needs to convince. While Obama fought hard to compromise with centrist Democrats, the P5+1, and the Iranian government, Biden will need to win over an even more prickly constituency: Senate Republicans. With Republicans holding half of the seats in the U.S. Senate, they hold the power to act as a serious impediment to any agreement. Moreover, they have several partisan reasons to do so: (1) further demolishing the Obama legacy, (2) leaving the door open to regime change in the future, and (3) accommodating Israel’s hardline position. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell has referred to the JCPOA as “flawed from the beginning” and major Republican figures have spread a multitude of lies and half-truths about the nature of the agreement, the most odious being that it sent U.S. taxpayer dollars to Iran to fund terrorism. Even some Democrats opposed the JCPOA, including Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer and the powerful Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Robert Menendez. Inside both parties, “think tanks” that promote hawkish policies toward Iran hold considerable sway. As a result, getting the 60 votes required to pass a new or modified agreement would be difficult and require bipartisan support. Although Biden often speaks optimistically about his ability to compromise with Republicans and moderates, it is yet to be seen how he could get them to resist playing an obstructionist role in the renegotiating process.
Russia and China may also frustrate attempts at negotiations, as they may hope to see Biden fail and challenge American international hegemony. They could potentially open separate talks with the regime or covertly violate the U.S. sanctions policy.
While the U.S. Senate, China, and Russia, may prove to be unwilling partners, Biden might feel more at home negotiating with America’s European allies. While Trump walked away from the JCPOA, Europe half-heartedly tried, unsuccessfully, to salvage it. European nations briefly discussed working together to mitigate the effects of U.S. sanctions on Iran but achieved nothing, all hesitant to buck the U.S. sanctions policy.
One opening for diplomacy with European allies now presents itself because of the global pandemic. The Biden administration and European governments may work together to address the humanitarian challenges created by their sanctions policy against Iran. President Biden has insisted that he does not want America’s sanctions policy to inhibit Iran’s Coronavirus response.
While U.S. sanctions currently have exemptions for humanitarian supplies, U.S. banking restrictions on Iran that have existed since before the JCPOA was ratified leave the country struggling to repatriate hard currency, making it difficult to import crucial medical and pharmaceutical supplies. As Human Rights Watch reports:
While the US government has built exemptions for humanitarian imports into its sanctions regime...in practice these exemptions have failed to offset the strong reluctance of US and European companies and banks to risk incurring sanctions and legal action by exporting or financing exempted humanitarian goods.
However, the regime’s corrupt mismanagement of its Coronavirus aid and its decision to ban the importation of Coronavirus vaccines made in the United States casts some doubt on the sincerity of its complaints. Moreover, the current sanctions policy has clearly driven a wedge between Europe and Iran. The regime's failure to receive a sufficient amount of basic humanitarian supplies prompted an ultimatum from the Iranian leadership to the Europeans: provide relief or we will violate the JCPOA. When no relief was provided, the Iranian government slowly began violating the terms of the agreement, promising to return to compliance if aid was given. This dynamic has weakened relations between Europe and Iran, as they are frustrated by Iran’s noncompliance. The Europeans are therefore likely to support Biden’s “hard-nosed diplomacy,” even if they might hold modest disagreements with Biden or are wary about America’s long-term trustworthiness as an ally. In general, European nations want America to rejoin the rules-based liberal international order and Biden will be happy to do so: compromising on Iran may provide a starting point.
Regional Stability and Human Rights
President Biden has two secondary goals concerning Iran. The first of these goals is to convince Iran to promote “regional security.” This would include some level of disarmament (particularly regarding its ballistic missile program), an end to its support for terrorist organizations, and a general level of acquiescence to U.S. policy in the region. The second goal is to persuade the Iranian regime to adhere to international human rights standards. This demand became even more pressing after the execution of Navid Afkiri, the Iranian wrestler executed for insulting the Supreme Leader, whose story made national headlines in the U.S. Obligatory calls for stability and human rights have been part of U.S. rhetoric toward several Middle East countries for decades. Although human rights have never taken a central role in U.S. policy, they have often been used as a (non)starter for negotiations in the past.
While the United States’ discussion of regional stability and human rights in Iran is at times very legitimate, it often reeks of hypocrisy. While the Iranian regime’s support for terrorist organizations and treatment of political dissidents, ethnic minorities, and LGBTQ people is a human rights disaster, America rarely levels similar criticisms toward its despotic allies in the broader Middle East, and that is not to mention how America’s own actions in the region have led to disastrous consequences for human dignity.
If the Biden administration would like to play a positive role in Iran’s foreign policy and human rights situation, it must open a good-faith dialogue with the regime. The Iranian leadership will not be coerced into divesting from its activities in the region, nor will they be forced into accepting international human rights standards that they see as selectively enforced. Only a long-term engagement that rethinks the American-Iranian relationship and rewards progress by the regime with some level of reciprocity can provide substantive change. U.S.-Iran relations are currently far too strained to make significant progress on this front, but these goals could be best served by a reconciliatory policy that would empower reformers within the regime.
There is a potential downside to President Biden’s rhetoric on regional stability and human rights. If this language merely represents short-term rhetoric to use as leverage for the renegotiation of the JCPOA rather than a long-term commitment, it would represent a cynical use of human rights goals. This posture would be a non-starter for negotiations and could be the most tempting pitfall for a Biden administration, particularly if forceful advocates of humanitarian intervention like USAID Director (and former UN Ambassador) Samantha Power enjoy considerable clout.
Other potential hindrances to negotiations on the regional stability front include reluctance from realist voices in the administration like Biden’s CIA Director William Burns. Burns views Iran and the Middle East generally as less of a priority compared to the threats posed by Russia and China. From this vantage point, Biden’s vision of “regional stability” could be achieved with a light footprint and without Iran. While this opinion may appear to be an abdication of America’s global responsibility, it may also prove appealing to a president wary of deeper involvement in the Middle East.
Conclusion
Newly in office, President Biden must now confront a variety of challenges in improving U.S.-Iran relations and re-entering or renegotiating the JCPOA. President Trump’s rash decision to exit the JCPOA has unfortunately isolated the U.S. and caused the original signatories of the deal to view the U.S. as untrustworthy. It is up to Biden to ease those concerns. He will need to convince Europeans, China, Russia, the U.S. Senate, and Iran that America will stay true to its commitments and that renegotiations are worthwhile. While Biden’s current refusal to accept overtures from the regime does not inspire optimism, a resolution is possible. Biden holds significant leverage due to the existing sanctions apparatus. If he can overcome domestic concerns about diplomacy with Iran by seeking demonstrable measures first from Iran (either on nuclear or regional issues), then he may be able use his leverage and the internal pressures within Iran to renegotiate the JCPOA. Unfortunately, there are also serious risks with the current strategy. Biden’s policy could ultimately turn out to be nothing but a cruel continuation of diplomatic pressure and unending sanctions on Iran as the country grows more impoverished and struggles to respond to the Coronavirus pandemic.
While domestic machinations in both countries are ultimately forming U.S. and Iran’s respective positions on re-entry to, or renegotiation of the JCPOA, what should not be forgotten are the real stakes of this diplomacy: millions of everyday Iranian lives, the (albeit minimal) potential of Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon, regional stability, and the reputation of the United States in the Middle East and the international stage more broadly.
