MYTH vs. FACT: Censorship in Iran
/Updated 2025 by Research Associate Nika Mobed
Previous versions published in 2017 and 2021 by Research Associates Ariane Gottlieb and Connor Bulgrin respectively
MYTH: The Iranian government exercises strict control over the press and tightly censors the Internet and media, making communication with the outside world virtually nonexistent. This censorship makes it impossible for Iranians to publicly criticize their government or obtain international news and perspectives on current events.
FACT: In reality, this is only a partial understanding of access to information in Iran. While the harsh policies and tactics used against journalists in the country are difficult to overstate, Iranians have found many ways to circumvent state censorship, such as bypassing the Internet firewall or accessing international channels via illegal satellite dishes. A complete understanding of media and censorship in Iran requires distinguishing government laws from the practices of average Iranians.
Press Restrictions:
When it comes to freedom of the media and Internet, it is undeniable that the Iranian government has implemented many restrictive laws and used force and intimidation to oppose political or cultural dissent. Freedom House, an American NGO dedicated to political freedom and human rights, has labeled Iranians’ access to the Internet as “not free,” giving the Islamic Republic a “Freedom on the Net” score of 12 out of 100 (with 100 being the most free). This score is indicative of the many government-imposed obstacles to Internet access and content. These include violations of Internet users’ rights by the government that make it difficult and dangerous for citizens or news organizations to criticize the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, or other taboo topics like the government’s role in the Israel-Palestine conflict or women’s liberation .
The government’s power to restrict freedom of the press is rooted in the country’s Constitution; Article 24 calls for press freedom, except in cases deemed “detrimental to the fundamental principles of Iran or the rights of the public.” The 1986 Press Law reaffirms this logic, stating that the news media should enjoy freedom of speech, so long as it does not “violate Islamic principles or the civic code.” The government has made use of its power over the press, and the result for journalism has been chilling. In 2024, the Iranian government imprisoned at least 91 journalists, many of which were sentenced to 14+ years, 50+ lashings, and fined millions of US dollars.The experience for imprisoned journalists – many of whom languish in Evin Prison – remains devastating. They can be subjected to torture, solitary confinement, or denied medical care or family visits. The result has been a reduction in news coverage and a growing trend of self-censorship among journalists. However, despite the challenges and risks of conducting news coverage in Iran, many centrist and reformist news outlets still operate amidst threats of shutdown or arrest. Additionally, the country has between 60,000 and 110,000 blogs, one of the largest numbers in the Middle East.
During his campaign, current president Masoud Pezeshkian declared, "I will make every effort to reform the ineffective filtering system...We must free the internet." He promised, "I will stand against filtering. The first steps were taken in December 2024, when apps banned during the 2022 protests, such as whats app, google play, were made available again. However, with political and administrative obstacles in the way, no other reform has taken place. Furthermore, the government’s ability to censor information and repress unfavorable news coverage remains strong and may have strengthened in recent years. For example, dozens of journalists and activists have reported that their cell phone SIM cards have been blocked by Iranian authorities and are unable to purchase a new one. This restriction is being used as an alternative to arresting them or other methods that require official action to force them into silence. A journalist, using the pseudonym Amir, even explained that all of his virtual resources, including banking, had been disabled, shaking his daily existence.
Censors, Firewalls, and Circumvention:
Given the official restrictions and limited media access in Iran, many Iranians receive their information via international media services, obtained through illegal satellite dishes. These dishes are not looked upon fondly by the state. General Mohammad Reza Naghdi, the Commander of the Basij has said, “the truth is that most satellite channels...deviate the society’s morality and culture,” even alleging that satellite dishes increase divorces, addiction, and societal insecurity. Given the official government stance against satellite dishes, authorities will periodically conduct raids, charge fines up to $2,800, and publicly destroy them in order to deter citizens from using them. Authorities also occasionally try to block signals from specific European satellites. In 2009, for example, French broadcasting companies were forced to move BBC Persian Television from a satellite, “Hot Bird 6,” to another signal to circumvent a sudden ban.
Yet, despite the official hard-line stance of the government against them, the use of satellite dishes in Iran is widespread, with an estimated 70% of Iranians using them to access news, entertainment, movies, or television programs. The United States, Dubai, and many European countries broadcast Persian language stations, hoping to reach the Iranian population. Through this content, Iranians hear international perspectives and stories that are not adequately covered domestically. This dynamic was particularly noteworthy during the 2009 Green Revolution. During this movement, the government tightly censored the coverage of protests. Still, Iranians used satellite dishes to view photographs and videos, domestic and foreign developments, and uncensored opinions broadcast on international news outlets.
An analogous work-around for access to censored media also exists on the Internet. The majority of Internet traffic in Iran travels through a central facility where government filters can censor out banned content (e.g., social media, pornographic sites, and some websites for art and news). However, Iranians can bypass these filters using proxy servers or Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Using this technology, much of the country has access to social media, with millions of Iranians using Telegram, WhatsApp, and Instagram. Social media use is so commonplace that many politicians have taken to using banned websites to reach their citizens. In 2017, all six presidential candidates used Twitter. Even the Supreme Leader has both a Twitter and an Instagram account.
Access to social media has allowed Iranians to communicate with the outside world, an activity that became so integral to the Green Revolution that it was dubbed a “Twitter Revolution.” Social media has also given Iranians the opportunity to form connections with people whom they would otherwise have little interaction with. One heartwarming example was the Facebook movement Israel Loves Iran, composed of Iranians and Israelis who photographed and shared pictures of themselves holding up posters with messages of support to people in the other country.
However, this reliance on VPNs presents significant risks. Many of these VPNs are insecure or even government-controlled, leaving users vulnerable to cyberattacks and exploitation, particularly children. The government’s ongoing efforts to block VPN traffic only complicate the situation, turning it into a constant struggle to maintain reliable internet access. Additionally, a black market for VPNs has emerged, profiting from the government’s censorship while perpetuating a cycle of digital restriction and circumvention.
The situation is made worse by U.S. sanctions, which limit Iranians' access to safe, paid VPNs and advanced cybersecurity tools. As a result, many users rely on free, insecure VPNs that are prone to malware and hacks, leading to data leaks, as seen in the 2024 cyberattack on local banks. In this digital landscape, VPNs serve as both a necessary tool for accessing the outside world and a significant security risk, highlighting the challenges of navigating a tightly controlled internet in an increasingly connected world.
Evolving Censorship Legislation
In 2020, the Iranian government cracked down on Internet use. After a top advisor to the Supreme Leader died, the government briefly took down the Farsi version of Wikipedia. Social media sites were also a repeated target for repression. The government blocked the encrypted messaging platform Signal and imprisoned the CEO of Aparat, a video-sharing network similar to Youtube. In September of 2020, the influential conservative lawmaker, Nasrollah Pejmanfar, initiated a draft law seeking military control of the Internet to protect Iranians from “manipulation and false information.” This proposal received forty signatures in the Iranian parliament and would've mandated fines and prison sentences for anyone offering access to foreign messaging apps or ways around the government’s restrictions. However, as of 2024 it has not been passed into law.
The government has also sought to increase its control over Internet use by establishing its own intranet service: the National Information Network (NIN). Iranian authorities have claimed that by spring of 2024 NIN will be complete. . This project is accompanied by a newly proposed law that would assign all Iranians an online identification. Together, these two proposals could seriously undermine Iranians’ ability to browse the Internet anonymously. Mahmoud Vaezi, the minister of communications, has already warned that there will come a day when there are no anonymous Internet users in Iran.
U.S. sanctions have also inhibited Iranians’ access to certain Internet services. Iranians are often unable to use international communications tools and services –like Amazon Cloud Web Services, Google Cloud, and Github.– Companies won’t sell their products to them or allow them to use their free services due to fears of violating U.S. sanctions. Although the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control has published General License D-1, a provision permitting the sale of “fee-based services and software incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet,” companies continue to worry about inadvertently violating U.S. sanctions policy. Consequently, Iranians struggle to access certain web services from either domestic or foreign sources. This dilemma is most harmful to dissident activists who are subject to monitoring, censorship, and repression.
While the Iranian government continues to restrict access to social media, new online platforms continue to emerge as old ones become more difficult to access. Clubhouse, a new audio chat app, is one of the most recent examples. Users openly debate their thoughts on the mandatory hijab, the 2021 elections, and the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. While some users hide their identities behind online aliases, others use their real names, potentially putting their safety at risk. While the Iranian government is unlikely to endorse the popularity of social media anytime soon, the persistence of Iranians to access these outlets ensures that they will continue to play a role in Iran’s political discourse.
Significant Internet Blackouts
In November 2019, Iranians witnessed the most severe Internet shutdown in their nation’s history. A government decision to raise fuel prices sparked widespread protests to which Iranian security forces responded violently, leaving more than 100 killed, hundreds more injured, and over 1,000 arrested. Almost immediately, citizens began circulating videos of their interactions with members of the security forces online. According to Amnesty International, these videos depicted the use of “firearms, water cannons and tear gas… against unarmed protesters and bystanders.” In an attempt to stop this flow of information, the government ordered Internet Service Providers to shut down, causing Iran’s Internet connectivity to fall to only four percent of its normal levels. While government officials claimed the shutdown was for “national security” purposes, its impacts were far-reaching.
The weeklong Internet shutdown made it incredibly difficult for Iranians to contact their friends and relatives living abroad. Communication ceased without warning, leaving families with no idea when they would again contact one another. The Internet shutdown also ground the economy to a halt. Start-ups, small businesses, and online businesses struggled to keep revenues coming in while expenses mounted. Mohsen Jalalpour, a former president of the Iran Chamber of Commerce, estimated that the shutdown forfeited $1.5 billion of economic activity. The legacy of this shutdown continues to remain in Iranians’ consciousness as they worry it could happen again without warning.
The fear of another sudden Internet blackout became a reality in 2022, as Iranians once again took to the streets in mass protests during the Woman, Life, Freedom movement. Sparked by the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini while in police custody, these protests quickly grew into a nationwide outcry against the oppressive policies of the Iranian government. Though the movement was initially sparked by the brutal treatment of women, it quickly expanded to include people of all genders, ages, and backgrounds who rallied against systemic repression and the country's deteriorating human rights conditions.
Security forces once again responded with violent crackdowns, even at times using live ammunition to disperse crowds, leading to the deaths of hundreds and the injury of thousands. In response, the Iranian government once again deployed Internet blackouts in an attempt to hinder the flow of information and limit the global reach of the protests. These blackouts made it nearly impossible for Iranians to communicate with the outside world, documenting the brutality or organizing resistance. As in 2019, the government’s tactic was aimed at silencing defiance and preventing the movement from gaining international momentum.
Conclusion
Though the government has implemented stringent and severe measures to limit freedom of speech and access to information, many Iranians have found ways to circumvent these blocks. The highly educated population in Iran has embraced illegal means of accessing foreign news services and social media as part of their everyday lives.According to the Iran Primer, a website from the United States Institute of Peace, “most [Iranian youth] are exposed to global media, ideas and culture through satellite television and the Internet.” When assessing freedom of information in Iran, the global community tends to draw conclusions based on laws and government practice but often neglect to see how average Iranians take it upon themselves to access information, share ideas, and reach out to each other and the world.
